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Roads of War:
Paved Highways and the Rise of IED Attacks in Afghanistan
Abstract
Paved roads have been widely heralded by members of the policymaking world as
a useful tool in combating the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in
Afghanistan. With the number of IED attacks growing exponentially since 2006,
government officials have made the case for greater funding for road construction by
explicitly linking paved roads with improved security conditions. This thesis subjects that
connection to greater scrutiny and gives voice to the few detractors who contend that
paved roads make security conditions worse. Moreover, this thesis examines new data on
IED attacks along roads in Afghanistan and concludes that paving has no meaningful
effect on the frequency of IED incidents, suggesting that policymakers should reassess
the value of road construction projects and the reasoning used to sell those projects.
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I. Introduction
“Improvised explosive devices, usually made of fertilizer, are the Afghan
insurgents' great force equalizer”
-Yaroslav Torfimov
Foreign Correspondent, Wall Street Journal
I remember the precise day the idea behind this thesis first came to me. It was
December 28, 2009 — the day I began reading David Kilcullen’s The Accidental
Guerrilla. The Afghan war was an intriguing topic to me, and I believed the writing of a
counterinsurgency expert would shed some light on the topic. It was his book that first
introduced me to the argument that paving roads reduces the number of IED attacks in
Afghanistan. The material also came in the shadow of a major policy address on
Afghanistan earlier that month by President Barack Obama. His speech touched upon a
variety of different points, but one quote in particular summarized his decision: “as
Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an
additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to
come home.”1 After listening to the President’s new strategy and after several days of
reading and note taking on Kilcullen’s book I asked myself, “are paved roads really a key
solution for something as complex as IED attacks in Afghanistan, and if so, how should
this new revelation change US strategy?”
I have spent much of my time since then asking myself that question, and for me
the answer has changed twice. The elegance and simplicity behind Kilcullen’s logic that
paved roads reduce IED attacks is compelling, and it wasn’t until a year later that I began
to doubt the claims of the former Australian army Lieutenant Colonel. Arguments made
1

Obama, Barack, “The New Way Forward” (speech presented at West Point to address
changes in US strategy in Afghanistan, New York, December 1, 2009).
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address>
(April 7, 2011)

7
by intellectuals like Joshua Foust, field researchers like Brian Glyn Williams and scholars
like John O’Loughlin all placed enough doubt in my mind that I began to believe the
opposite — that paving roads increases IED attacks.2 It wasn’t late in the process that my
mind changed a second time. After examining new data on IED attacks along roads in
Afghanistan, I concluded that paving roads has no meaningful impact on the frequency of
IED attacks, positive or negative.

Structure
I divide my analysis of IEDs among four sections. I begin by tracing how IED
attacks arrived in Afghanistan, starting with how the war has changed since 2001.
Second, I define and assess the impact of IEDs and IED countermeasures in Afghanistan,
including how policymakers, field researchers and civil war and insurgency theorists
describe the impacts of road construction projects on IED attacks. Third, I test these
assessments of road projects against military data on IEDs from Afghanistan, using two
separate roads from eastern and southern Afghanistan as case studies. In the conclusion, I
offer some practical suggestions for policymakers based on the findings in the third
section.

Sources of Information
This thesis draws extensively from three sources of information: field research
from Afghanistan conducted between the start of 2007 and 2009 by Brian Glyn Williams,
2

Joshua Foust is fellow at the American Security Project; Brian Glyn Willaims is an
Associate Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth;
and a John O’Loughlin is a Professor of Geography at the University of ColoradoBoulder.
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Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle; government documents from the US Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO); and geographic data on IEDs between 2004
and 2009 — known more commonly in the press as the “Afghan war logs”3 — leaked by
the website WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010.

3

Alexandra Topping and Jo Adetunji, “Afghanistan War Logs: Wikileaks Founder
Rebuts White House Criticism,” The Guardian, July 26, 2006,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/war-logs-wikileaks-rebuts-criticism>
(April 7, 2011).
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II. The Arrival of IEDs
Background
Aside from the merits of the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan, the
mere fact a surge was deemed necessary to turn the tide of the war is emblematic of how
much the nature of the war has changed since 2001. Commonly described the “Forgotten
War,” the Afghan war has not been a consistent battle between Taliban insurgents and
US and coalition forces.4 In the first years following the invasion, the United States was
enormously successful in Afghanistan. The initial invasion lasted less than two months,
as Taliban resistance collapsed almost immediately. During the first four years following
the collapse of the Taliban, US forces faced relatively low levels of insurgent violence,
and US operations were primarily geared at eliminating Taliban remnants in the country.5
With superior firepower, particularly the use of tactical aircraft armed with state-of-theart weaponry, the United States held a consistent advantage against Taliban forces using
traditional guerilla warfare tactics. By late 2005, military commanders believed that their
operations, combined with added political and economic reconstruction, had essentially
ended the insurgency.6

4

Major news outlets have repeatedly used this terminology to describe the war in
Afghanistan. For examples see Charles M. Sennott, “Afghanistan: After 5 years, a
forgotten war?,” New York Times, September 12, 2006,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/asia/12iht-afghan.2785628.html> (April 7,
2011); Carlotta Gall, “Despite Years of U.S. Pressure, Taliban Fight on in Jagged Hills,”
New York Times, June 4, 2005,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E7D71438F937A35755C0A9639
C8B63> (April 7, 2011).
5
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy by Kenneth Katzman (Washington, DC:
November 26, 2008), 23.
6
Kenneth Katzman, 23.
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They were wrong. As Lieutenant General David Barno, the US and coalition
commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, explained, “since 2006 the Taliban and
[Al-Qaeda have] gathered strength, changed tactics, and increased their capabilities and
attacks.“7 Like the Stinger missiles the US supplied to the mujahideen in Afghanistan in
the 1980s, Taliban insurgents needed an equalizer — something to help level the playing
field. The Taliban found that equalizer in a tactic that has heavily shaped the nature of the
Afghan war since 2006: improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The Iraq Connection
Based on his field research during the spring of 2007, Brian Glyn Williams argues
that Afghanistan experienced an “Iraq effect,” or the transfer of terrorist tactics from Iraq
to Afghanistan, beginning in the summer of 2006. The US widely suspected that many of
Al-Qaeda’s emissaries from Iraq were crossing between the two theatres as early as 2003,
sharing information on tactics and encouraging Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups to
replace their strategy of traditional guerrilla warfare with IED and suicide operations.8 In
a demonstration of the law unintended consequences, Williams explains that those
insurgents initially opposed to changing tactics were convinced to adopt them after

7

Valentina Taddeo, “US Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan
Campaign.” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 29-31,
<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/3/> (April 7, 2011).
8
Brian Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar’s Missiles. A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in
Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 31,
<http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/publications.html> (April 7, 2011).
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watching DVDs of successful IED and suicide attacks on US forces in Iraq.9 These
DVDs were widely available in the tribal regions of Pakistan by the summer of 2004.
Taliban leaders have also admitted to having regular interaction with members of the
Iraqi insurgency. Mullah Dadullah, a former senior Taliban military commander, explains
in an interview quoted by Williams that Afghan insurgents learned the bombings they
carry out from Iraqi insurgents, adding that the Taliban regularly sends individuals to Iraq
to learn “more effective killing techniques.”10 After a year of testing the impact of IED
and suicide attacks the Taliban began to regularly deploy both tactics in 2006. Observers
began to notice the change, explaining that the Afghan insurgents appeared to have
learned the techniques from Iraqi insurgents.11 As the Afghan National Directorate of
Security bluntly put it in 2007, “Had the Americans not invaded Iraq and created a jihadi
training ground there, we would never have had these bombers here. This all comes to us
as a result of America’s war against (Saddam) Hussein.”12

9

The rise of suicide bombing in Afghanistan, although not the focus of this thesis, could
serve as a useful case study confirming and challenging existing notions of the
motivations behind suicide bombing. The strategic application of suicide bombing in
Afghanistan lends credence to Robert Pape’s central claim that there is a strategic logic
behind suicide terrorism. See Robert Pape, “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of
Suicide Terrorism,” Australian Army Journal 3, no. 3 (Summer 2006) and Assaf
Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 20082009) for additional literature on suicide terrorism.
10
Williams, 34.
11
Peter Bergen, “The Taliban, Regrouped and Rearmed,” The Washington Post,
September 10, 2006, < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/08/AR2006090801614.html> (April 7, 2011).
12
Williams, 32.
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III. Addressing IEDs: Roads and The Search for Solutions
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) arrived in Afghanistan under similar
circumstances as suicide bombings, but while suicide attacks have remained limited to a
few hundred incidents per year, the frequency of IED attacks has risen far more
dramatically. Since 2005, these devices have continued to produce devastating results
against NATO and US forces and civilians, and today, IEDs are one of the key tactical
weapons used by the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups. The US military defines
an IED as:
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating
destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and
designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate
military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.13
In principle any explosive weapon not constructed on a production line may be
classified as an IED. This definition would include not only roadside bombs but also car
bombs, shape charge IEDs and suicide bombs.14 However, given the physical differences
between a so-called “smart” suicide bomb and other improvised explosive devices, this
thesis is limited to exploring the only the latter tactic.
In response to the rise of this tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan, the office of the
Army Chief of Staff established the Army IED Task Force in October 2003, tasked with
coordinating the efforts of other government agencies, the private sector, academics and
other organizations to develop new methods and technologies to counter IEDs. The task
13

U.S. Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint
Publication 1-02), 177.
14
Carlo Kopp, “Technology of Improvised Explosive Devices,” Defence Today, 46,
<www.ausairpower.net/DT-IED-1007.pdf> (April 7, 2011).
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force was made permanent in February 2006 and was renamed the Joint IED Defeat
Organization (JIEDDO). However, despite the organization’s efforts IED attacks are
more frequent and as deadly as ever. JIEDDO itself explained in its FY 2009 Annual
Report that the number of IED incidents in Afghanistan nearly doubled from FY 2008
and the number of casualties caused by IEDs increased 39 percent.15 In short, the United
States has not yet developed a strategy or technology that has significantly decreased
these numbers.

Uniqueness of Afghanistan IEDs
“We are essentially attempting to find a fertilizer-based bomb, so it has very low
or no metallic content, and it is [typically] buried [in the dirt on] an unimproved road.”
This explanation by the Director of JIEDDO — Lieutenant General Michael L. Oates —
is the most basic and accurate characterization of the types of IEDs the US military faces
in Afghanistan. The overwhelming majority of IED attacks are ammonium nitrate-based
explosives triggered by a pressure plate.16 A chemical compound commonly found in
high-nitrogen fertilizer, ammonium nitrate was the explosive used in 80 to 90 percent of
Afghan IEDs between 2007 and 2009.17 These devices are different from many in Iraq,

15

U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. Annual Report FY 2009.
(Washington, DC: 2009).
16
Michael L. Oates, “US Government Efforts to Counter IEDs,” Foreign Press Center,
Washington, DC: December 3, 2010.
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20101206_FPC_LTG_Oates_on%2520_EDs.
pdf> (April 7, 2011).
17
Michael Flynn, “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions, and Objectives”
(PowerPoint slides, December 22, 2009), 9-11.
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where a significant number of military-grade munitions leftover from Saddam Hussein’s
regime are used as IEDs.18
However, the reality that the overwhelming majority of attacks are comprised of
homemade explosives should not imply that IEDs in Afghanistan are unvaried or
unsophisticated. Ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer bombs are the most common, but the
Haqqani network, an insurgent group closely allied with the Taliban located principally
in eastern Afghanistan, prefers to use potassium chlorate explosives. Roadside bombs are
also often supplemented with additional tactics, including small unit ambushes when first
responders arrive on the scene and the use of conventional weapons.19 Afghan insurgents
have increasingly used even more powerful IEDs, explosively formed projectiles (EFPs)
— made from pipes filled with explosives — that are commonly used in Iraq. These
devices strike with enough power to penetrate heavy armor, producing more heavy
casualties than traditional IEDs.20

Impact of IED Attacks
Given the death tolls caused by IEDs, finding a technology or method to combat
these devices is one of the most important priorities for the US military. By every
measure IED attacks cause more deaths than any other tactic utilized by the Afghan
insurgency. For NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), roadside bombs

18

Oates, Foreign Press Center, December 6, 2010.
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson
(Washington, DC: August 28, 2007), 3.
20
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson (Washington, DC:
February 10, 2006), 3.
19
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were responsible for the majority of the deaths of coalition forces, totaling an estimated
60 percent in 2009.21 The Department of Defense estimates that while suicide bombs
were responsible for less than two percent of US troops deaths since the start of the war,
IED attacks were responsible for a plurality — 40.8 percent — of US troop deaths,
despite the fact that IEDs were not widely used in Afghanistan prior to 2006. IEDs were
also responsible for a majority of US troop deaths in two of the last three years.22
Although Taliban insurgent attacks are primarily targeted toward government or military
forces they are often carried out in areas frequented by civilians, often resulting in an
even larger number of civilian casualties.23 Of all the casualties from IED attacks, about
two-thirds are Afghan.24 Of the 1,630 civilian deaths reportedly caused by the insurgency
in 2009, 47 percent were due to IED attacks.25
These attacks have also inhibited the military’s efforts to win over the local
population — a necessary step in a successful counterinsurgency operation. Mullah
Mohammed Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban insurgency, published a new code
of conduct for insurgents in 2009 in an attempt to win local support for the Taliban.
Among its 13 chapters and 67 articles, the book prohibits certain types of behavior,
including taking children for jihad, avoiding the deaths of locals while conducting suicide
21

“Roadside Bombs Surge in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, June 4, 2009,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31111482/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia>
(April 7, 2011).
22
Ian S. Livingston et al, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction &
Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, February 28, 2011, 11.
23
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Annual
Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009, Kabul: January 2010, 5.
24
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, JIEDDO Fact Sheet,
August 2010
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20100804_JIEDDO_Fact_Sheet.pdf> (April,
2011).
25
UNAMA (January 2010), 15.
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bombings and eliminating forced donations from the population.26 Despite these alleged
changes, multiple human rights organizations note that IED attacks are still used by the
Taliban to spread fear and to intimidate the local population, while other insurgent groups
like the Haqqani network in eastern Afghanistan are even less willing to discriminate
between their targets, attacking civilians and coalition forces in equal numbers.27 Locals
commonly report feeling trapped between the fear of being attacked by insurgents if they
do cooperate and being attacked by US forces if they do not.28

Existing Countermeasures
Both Congress and the Department of Defense have recognized the threat posed
by IED attacks. The DoD has been aware of the danger of these devices dating back to
the start of the Iraqi insurgency in 2003, and Congress has allocated billions of dollars to
various countermeasures through JIEDDO.29 The organization’s project budget is $3.465
billion for FY2011, and in total, the Pentagon has invested over $20 billion developing
technologies to address IEDs, ranging from basic tactics to the new, cutting-edge

26

Mullah Mohammed Omar, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate: Rules and Regulations for
Mujahidin (2009),
<www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf>.
27
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan Mid-Year
Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Kabul: August 2010, 21. Oates,
Foreign Press Center, 7.
28
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Insurgent Abuses Against
Afghan Civilians, December 2008, 4.
29
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Marine Corps
Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicles, December 8, 2008, Report No. D-2009-030, i
<http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/dod-ig-report-20081208c.pdf>.

17
technology.30 However, only a few of initiatives have produced results, leaving the US
still struggling to find an effective countermeasure for these homemade devices.
Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
Table 1: Funding to the Joint IED Defeat Organization
By fiscal year (in billions)
Fiscal Year
Funding

FY06
$3.7

31

FY07
$4.393

32

FY08
$3.551

33

FY09
$3.1

34

FY10
$3.38

35

FY11
$3.465

Total
36

$21.589

Within its annual report, JIEDDO divides its initiatives into three broad categories
— “defeat the device,” those that detect and disarm IEDs using new or existing
technologies; “attack the network,” those that target the individuals and groups planting
IEDs; and “train the force,” those that instruct soldiers on how to conduct counter-IED
operations and operate equipment. 37
“Defeat the Device”
30

U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, “JIEDDO Fiscal Year
2011 Budget,” press release, February 5, 2010,
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/article.aspx?ID=854> (April 7, 2011). Rowan Scarborough,
“Hunter lauds tactic to snuff IEDs,” Washington Times, September 16, 2010,
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/16/lawmaker-lauds-tactic-to-snuffieds-in-war-zones> (April 7, 2011).
31
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to
Improve Visibility and Coordination of DoD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Efforts (2010), < www.gao.gov/new.items/d1095.pdf> (April 7, 2011).
32
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2007,
17
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/2007_JIEDDO%2520Annual%2520Report_(
U).pdf> (April 7, 2011).
33
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2008,
7
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20090625_FULL_2008_Annual_Report_Uncl
assified_v4.pdf> (April 7, 2011).
34
Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2009, 13-17
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20090909_FULL_2009%2520Annual%2520R
eport_Unclassified_v1_lr.pdf> (April 7, 2011).
35
Joint IED Defeat Organization, press release, February 5, 2010.
36
Joint IED Defeat Organization, press release, February 5, 2010.
37
JIEDDO, Annual Report FY 2009, 11-15.
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JIEDDO has been unable to innovate efficient technologies to detect and disarm
IEDs. The most sophisticated technologies developed by JIEDDO tend to locate 50
percent of IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, despite five years and $9.4 billion
worth of investments, bomb-sniffing dogs are still the most efficient method of detecting
the devices, capable of locating 80 percent of IEDs when paired with trained handlers.38
As a result Congress has heavily cut funding for IED detection, from $2.53B in 2007 to
$1.973B in 2008 and $1.4B in 2009. Meanwhile, the military has continued to invest in
IED-sniffing dogs. K2 Solutions Inc., a private contractor to the military, agreed last year
to an $8.7 million contract with the Marine Corps to provide an additional 112 trained
and certified dogs.39 Currently there are 300 of these IED-sniffing dogs deployed in
Afghanistan, many of them operating under the IED detector dog program launched by
the Marine Corps in 2007.40
Electronic “jammers,” designed to disrupt the frequencies of cell phone or radio
waves that trigger IEDs, have become less effective over time. Most IEDs in Afghanistan
initially used this type of trigger, and by employing jammers the military reduced radio-

38

Shaun Waterman, “General: K-9 Teams Find IEDs Better than $10 Billion Tech Gear,”
Washington Times, October 20, 2010
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/general-k-9-teams-find-ieds-better10-billion-tech/> (April 7, 2011). Sandra Erwin, “Technology Falls Short in the War
Against IEDs,” National Defense Magazine, October 10, 2010,
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=221> (April 7,
2011).
39
Dan Lamothe, “Dogs Becoming Essential in Fight Against IEDs,” Marine Corps Times,
March 25, 2010,
<http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/marine_dogs_032510w/> (April 7,
2011).
40
Ali Sanders, “U.S. Troops Experience Downturn in IED Violence,” JIEDDO Public
Affairs press release, February 3, 2011,
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20110203_Downtrend_IED_story.pdf> (April
7, 2011).

19
controlled IEDs to less than 10 percent of all explosive devices.41 The military also
developed a way to operate jammers without disrupting its own equipment.42 However,
insurgents responded by devising simpler IEDs that use pressure plate devices instead,
ones that are immune to jammers. While the technology has been a success, the highest
detection rates are still achieved using K-9 units.43
“Attack the Network”
The US military has also applied social network analysis to target insurgent
groups planting IEDs. Rooted in the belief that a roadside bomb is not the work of a
single individual, the process disrupts IED networks by identifying and targeting key
individuals responsible for the bombs. The technique has been used both in Iraq and
Afghanistan and is most notable for contributing to the capture of Saddam Hussein in
December 2003.44 The military has long appreciated the need to study relationships, but
computer modeling has helped produce conclusions more rapidly than experienced
intelligence analysts.45 The military has also provided this type of expertise to its soldiers
at the battalion and brigade level.46
“Train the Force”

41

Matthew O’Hara (2008), Detection of IED Emplacement in Urban Environments,
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 19.
42
Noah Shachtman, “Ratio-Friendly Jammers?” Wired, March 16, 2007
<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/03/american_radiof/> (April 7, 2011).
43
Shaun Waterman, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/general-k-9teams-find-ieds-better-10-billion-tech/>.
44
Tom Gjelten, “U.S. ‘Connects the Dots’ to Catch Roadside Bombers,” National Public
Radio, December 3, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/03/131755378/u-s-connectsthe-dots-to-catch-roadside-bombers> (April 7, 2011).
45
Tom Gjelten <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/03/131755378/u-s-connects-the-dots-tocatch-roadside-bombers>.
46
“Defeating the IED,” Military Training Technology, February 2010, 2
<http://kmimediagroup.com/files/MT2%2015-1_JIEDDO.pdf> (April 7, 2011).
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JIEDDO has invested $400 to $500 million per year in training soldiers to identify
and search for IED explosives, most notably through the Joint Center of Excellence
(JCOE).47 These skills are then tested through various simulations and training exercises
to prepare soldiers for likely real-world scenarios.
Additional Countermeasures
Beyond funding to JIEDDO, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) are also one of the primary methods used to curb the death tolls of IED
attacks. While the Department of Defense did not initially acquire funding for the safer
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, the DoD pushed for a rise
HMMWV investment in FY2004. A significant investment in force protection equipment
was one of the primary drivers behind the rise in war-related investment costs from
FY2004 to FY2009. As a result, production of armored HMMWVs rose dramatically —
from 15 per month in August 2003 to 450 per month in December 2004.48 These vehicles
are still, however, vulnerable to EFPs.49
In response to rising death tolls the DoD launched another procurement initiative
in 2007 to replace up-armored HMMWVs with MRAPs. MRAP funding tripled from
$5.411 billion in FY2007 to $16.838 billion in FY2008. Used in limited numbers in Iraq
and Afghanistan in 2003, the MRAPs were shown to provide “significantly more
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protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than up-armored HMMWVs.”50
DoD officials have explained that the casualty rate for an MRAP (6 percent) is less than
half that of an M-1 Abrams battle tank (15 percent) and less than a third of an up-armored
HMMWV (22 percent).51 These numbers have been reflected in IED incidents in
Afghanistan. Between January and July 2007 the average IED attack on a Humvee killed
an occupant 80 percent of the time, but that number drops to 15 percent among attacks on
MRAP vehicles.52
However, the added security comes with certain tradeoffs. The armor provides
better protection from typical roadside bombs, but the armor can still be penetrated with
EFPs. As a result, military officials expect insurgents to increase their use of these more
deadly devices.53 The weight added onto the Humvee also hinders the payload and
performance of the vehicle.54 Added weight forces drivers to go slower, meaning that the
vehicles are more protected from any individual IED but are more vulnerable to
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command-detonated IEDs and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).55 As a result, US forces
are not currently using many older MRAPs in Afghanistan. As the Congressional
Research Service questions, “if a large number of MRAPs are, in fact, not being used
then a fundamental question is, why were they shipped to Afghanistan in the first
place?”56
The Afghan government has taken some its own steps to curb IED attacks.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued a decree in January 2010 banning the importation,
use, production, storage or sale of ammonium nitrate. 57 NATO estimates that less than 5
percent of the nitrate fertilizer is used for a legitimate use, while the chemical is a major
component in 80 to 90 percent of IED attacks.58

Lack of Progress
While some of these technologies have demonstrated results, none of them have
been able to reverse the increasingly grim IED statistics. Between 2007 and 2009, the
number of IED attacks in Afghanistan has tripled while deaths caused by IED attacks
among US soldiers have quadrupled. 59 While larger numbers of IEDs may result in a
larger number of deaths regardless of how effective US countermeasures may be, the
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dramatic rise in IED incidents demonstrates that insurgents have not been deterred by US
countermeasures. Most importantly, IED countermeasures have failed to positively
change two of the most important statistics: the IED detection rate and the rate of
“effective incidents” — those that injure or kill coalition forces.60 The rate of detection of
IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan has held steady around 50 percent, despite billions of
dollars worth of investment to improve it.61 The percentage of effective incidents is even
worse. As a percentage of IED attacks, the number of effective incidents has increased
over the last three years, from 7.7 percent in 2007 to 10.0 percent in 2008 and 2009 to
10.8 percent through May 2010.62 Therefore, as of 2010 JIEDDO’s countermeasures have
been unable to effectively address the problem of IEDs.

A Development Solution: Roads
Background
Prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, it was the Soviet Union that built
much of Afghanistan's road network. The Soviets built roads during the 1960s and 1970s
prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, including the ring road system linking Afghanistan’s
major cities. Since that time, three decades of war have largely destroyed all road
infrastructure in the country. By the late 1990s, the ring road was so destroyed that it
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ceased to exist in many areas beyond a dirt track.63 While a few sporadic road
improvements were made under the Taliban regime, the US Agency of International
Development (USAID) estimated that Afghanistan had only about 50 kilometers of paved
roads prior to 2001.64

The Case for Roads
In the absence of a panacea or silver bullet, several policymakers throughout the
length of Afghan war have supported a less straightforward method to combat IEDs —
building roads. Even JIEDDO has stressed the importance of non-technological ways to
combat IEDs, highlighting the importance of political reconciliation.65 Under a
counterinsurgency strategy, reconciliation starts with winning over the populous, which
requires that the United States both demonstrate its long-term investment in
Afghanistan’s future and present tangible benefits to locals. Roads fulfill those criteria,
and several field researchers, theorists and policymakers contend that roads decrease the
frequency of IED attacks.
Among its supporters, roads are hailed as an effective solution for simultaneously
addressing the logistical and systemic issues behind IED attacks — beginning with the
pavement of the road itself. David Kilcullen, a former senior counterinsurgency adviser
to General David Petraeus, suggests that the primary effect of road construction on IEDs
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is derived from the pavement.66 Kilcullen argues insurgents are faced with a two options
when attempting to place an IED along a paved road. Insurgents could dig through the
hard surface, but this requires more time or a larger number of individuals than on an
unpaved road, making it more likely the insurgents will be caught. Furthermore, the
disturbance of the smooth pavement makes the IED easier for coalition forces to spot.
Alternatively, insurgents can place the IED on the surface — either on the pavement or
on the sides of the road. Coalition commanders spent considerable time considering this
possibility, but ultimately concluded the devices would still be easier to spot than ones
buried in the roadway, and therefore, they would still be better off with pavement than
without it.67 Faced two less-than-ideal options, Kilcullen concludes that IED incidents
should decline.
Road projects also provide incentive to locals to report the placement of IEDs.
Road projects developed under Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) — government
organizations that combine military and civilian reconstruction experts to work on
reconstruction projects in volatile areas — initiate a series of negotiations with local
tribal elders to construct portions of the road running through their territory. These elders
then distribute jobs securing and constructing the road to their people, giving the
populous a sense of ownership over the road. This is particularly the case with PRTs
operating under a “10-kilometer rule,” which requires that 80 percent of unskilled labor
come from within 10 kilometers of the project.68 Kilcullen contends that while IED
attacks may rise in the short-term due to a road project, locals that value the project
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respond to attacks by immediately repairing the road and providing intelligence on the
insurgents they believe are responsible. As Lieutenant Colonel Chris Cavoli, a battalion
commander for the PRT in Kunar province, remarked, “…the road helped us get the
population to help us with IEDs…[t]here was one period, winter [2007], when we had 17
IEDs…14 turned in by locals or found by our guards, 3 found by our Huskies…zero
exploded.”69
The projects deprive insurgents of local support by connecting the population to
the Afghan government. Before beginning construction, Provincial Reconstruction Teams
reach out to district governors and local tribal elders to establish political institutions, or
shuras. Enticed by the prospect of securing jobs and the power to consult on the project,
elders come forward to participate in the shura.70 Road projects also generate disputes
that government representatives can mediate, connecting themselves to the locals while
raising their own status.71 Once built, the road also leads to traffic safety issues that can
be managed by the Afghan government and used as an opportunity to create a habit of
cooperation between the government and local tribes. Government officials, both on the
provincial and national level, can also more easily and more frequently visit local leaders
thanks to the dramatically reduced travel time. For instance, the road between Kabul and
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Kandahar cut traveling time to a third.72 The drop in travel time also works in favor of
Afghan forces.73
Finally, road projects provide economic incentives to locals. PRTs track the price
insurgents offer individuals to attack roads or vehicles and ensure that they pay their road
workers slightly more, eliminating any financial temptation for workers to plant IEDs or
sabotage road construction projects. Beyond individual employment, decreased travel
time, when combined when improved security, encourages the population in invest in
crops because products are more likely to reach a market safe and unspoiled.74 USAID
has stressed this particular point, identifying the improvement of roads to market centers
as key indicator of the development of a licit economy in Afghanistan.75 US government
officials have also used improved prosperity in one district to entice tribal elders in others
into guaranteeing security. With local support, the military clears new areas, following up
with reconstruction projects.76
The Bush Administration, while not initially supportive of roads during the first
year of the Afghan war, eventually reversed its stance. President Karzai’s initial attempts
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to reconstruct the ring road around Afghanistan were turned down.77 Even USAID, the
organization used today to manage most US-sponsored road construction in Afghanistan,
initially declined to support the project, stating the organization “did not do road
building.”78 During meetings in January and February 2002, Robert Finn, the first official
American ambassador to Afghanistan in nearly 20 years, proposed investing in the
Afghan ring road as a way to win the loyalty of locals.79 Finn has maintained this
position, writing in 2007, “the more roads and infrastructure, the less the influence of the
Taliban.”80 The Administration reversed course as President Bush pledged support for
Afghan reconstruction, including road building, in a speech in April 2002.81 That pledge
translated into $297 million in reconstruction funds, and by November 2002, the US
agreed to build its first highway, connecting Kabul to Herat via Kandahar.82
High-level policymakers — both in the military and the State Department — have
bought into the connection between roads and security and have played a key role in
acquiring funding for road building. Former Afghan Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann
explains that while the US allocated some initial funding to road projects during the first
few years of the war, that funding had flat-lined by 2006. The draft 2006 budget, unlike
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the FY 2004 budget, would have significantly underfunded development by committing
funds only to existing road projects.83 Hoping to significantly expand funding for road
construction, Neumann developed a $600.9 million supplement with $223 million for
roads.84 Facing significant resistance and the absence of a sense of urgency from
Congress, Neumann explains that he won support for the project gradually through
reports, conversations and individual meetings, as well as continuously stressing the
connection between road building and security to key individual throughout the US
government, starting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Neumann and Lieutenant
General Karl Eikenberry, then the Commander of the Combined Forces Command in
Afghanistan, couched their funding requests in security rather than developmental terms
as war deteriorated in 2006. “Where we opened roads security increased, the economy
expanded, and it become harder for the insurgents to conceal bombs. We endlessly
quoted Eikenberry’s statement, ‘Where the roads end, the insurgency begins.’”85 Military
officials in Afghanistan have reiterated this claim, stating simply, “if you have a paved
road here, you have fewer improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”86
The support of policymakers for additional roads has translated into billions of
dollars for construction projects. Along with managing the majority of overall US
assistance to Afghanistan, USAID has handled the majority of funding for these
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projects.87 Road construction has become a significant segment of the agency’s budget
for Afghanistan, constituting 20 percent of USAID’s $5.9 billion in assistance as of 2008.
By September of that year, USAID had constructed or rehabilitated over 1,650 miles of
roads.88 Meanwhile, under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the
Department of Defense has also allocated $300 million for civilian road projects, with an
additional $260 million in roads for military purposes.89
Table 2: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, by Program Category
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By fiscal year (in millions)
Program
Category

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007
request

2008
request

Total

Percent of
Total

Roads

$51

$142

$354

$276

$255

$446

$338

$1,862
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Table 3: U.S. Government Funding Provided for Reconstruction, within Economic and social
91
development
By fiscal year (in millions)
Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

Funding

$124

$295

$855

$1,240

$706

$1,191

$1,491

$1,871

$7,776

Few experts have been critical of Kilcullen’s association of road building with
decreases in IED attacks, but those that have argued that the association is positive, not
negative. In short, road building increases IED attacks. As Joshua Foust, a fellow at the
American Security Project, argues, discussion over road building largely omits how
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insurgents can adapt to paved roads. Coalition forces and civilians are not the only groups
that can take advantage of the new projects. Whether paved or unpaved, roads are still at
a fixed location and can be used by anyone, and without constant patrols by US and
coalition forces Taliban militants and other insurgent groups can lay down IEDs on the
roads and quickly escape.92 During the Soviet-Afghan war, insurgents were able to use
their mastery of the roads to prevent the consistent transport of supplies into Afghanistan,
preventing the Soviets from supporting a larger force.93 As a result of reduced travel time,
increased traffic along paved highways may also provide additional incentive to
insurgents to target those roads. The level of violence along major paved highways adds
weight to this claim. While roads are generally a target for insurgent attacks — with 85.9
percent of all insurgent violence occurring near a road — John O’Loughlin finds that
insurgent incidents within a five-kilometer buffer of the ring road are higher than
coalition incidents, concluding that the ring road has become a disproportionately large
target for IED attacks because it remains a major transport artery for government and
allied forces.”94 The Kabul-Kandahar section of the ring road, a signature construction
project built well before IEDs were common in Afghanistan, has been nicknamed the
“highway to hell” and is commonly the sight of kidnappings and insurgent attacks.
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Insurgents hold control of many sections of the road, even by day in certain areas.95
Multiple news outlets have reported a Taliban resurgence along this road by 2007,
claiming that insurgents control the road and many of the villages along it.96 Even smaller
road projects off of Highway 1, such as the Tangi Valley road, are dubbed “IED alley.”97
Back in May 2007, Brian Glyn Williams applied this same title to another paved road —
the Kabul-Gardez highway — that was completed over a half year earlier in September
2006.98 Despite paving thousands of kilometers of roads over the course of the war,
military officials admitted in 2009 that it is more dangerous to travel by road in
Afghanistan today than back under the Taliban.99
The risk associated with traveling on paved roads has limited the pace of
development in Afghanistan. Taliban attacks make traveling on paved roads a less
appealing option, limiting the effect the road project can contribute to improving the
economy and underscoring the weakness of the Afghan central government.100 The
danger along the roads has similarly limited the impact of NGOs. Many NGOs have
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limited their movement, delayed or cut back projects and avoided the roads entirely. As
Afghan Development Association Director Esmatullah Haidary explained, most
foreigners avoid the roads by traveling by plane, and in southern Afghanistan, aid
workers are largely limited to city centers for security purposes.101 By forcing aid
workers to cut back on development projects, the violence ensures that the needs of the
local population are less effectively met.
If road construction projects are a particular target for insurgents, one should
expect the US government and its partners to consistently fail to meet targets for road
construction. This is precisely what has happened, and contractors have explained that
poor security conditions are primarily to blame.102 USAID failed to meet its targets for
kilometers of road paved annually from 2006 to 2008. The Japanese government finally
completed a 114-kilometer section of the Kandahar-Heart road in southern Afghanistan
in July 2009, despite initially estimating that the section would be completed three years
earlier.103 Security along the road from the Kajaki Dam to the ring road became so severe
between 2007 and 2008 that the project was terminated despite of the fact USAID had
already spent $5 million.104
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Even if road projects improve security in the short-term, critics contend the
Afghan government lacks the long-term resources to cover the costs of maintaining paved
roads. No sustainable road maintenance program exists, and without funding,
maintenance has been neglected.105 The Afghan Ministry of Public Works estimated in
2007 that road maintenance would cost $30 million, yet the Ministry of Finance only
allocated $8 million to the program, forcing the ministry workers to undertake only
occasional maintenance. These costs are expected to rise as additional projects are
completed. An estimate by Asian Development Bank pegs the annual cost of road
maintenance between 2011 and 2015 to be $85 million to $90 million annually, excluding
the costs of rural roads.106 Maintenance will be particularly necessary given the lesser
quality of the material used to build the roads. The average cost of a paved road in
Afghanistan is about $500,000 per kilometer, far below the $3 million to $6 million
typically needed to build a road in the US, Europe or China. Matthew Nasuti, an expert
on reconstruction, contends that number should be higher given the need to ship
equipment, machinery and asphalt to Afghanistan, and cheap labor can only account for
part of the difference.107 Nasuti concludes that USAID has prioritized the quantity of
roads over quality, noting that the agency does not provide comprehensive data on the
quality of the road materials. NGOs studying roads in Afghanistan have discovered
similar quality issues. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an NGO focused on improving
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transparency and accountability, notes that on most district roads, “companies have used
Double Basement Surface Treatment (DBST), whose life expectancy is not more than 3
years.”108 According to the DoD, this type of road needs to be continuously treated —
even in lightly trafficked areas — to maintain an acceptable level of service.109 USAID
and international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect
new projects, but unless this funding continues Afghanistan will eventually be left with a
crumbling road system, ensuring that neither the economic nor security benefits of roads
are long lasting.

The Scholarly Divide
Scholars have been equally divided on a deeper issue behind road construction —
does remoteness (generally due to a lack of roads) help or inhibit a government from
defeating an insurgency?
Certain civil war scholars have supported the broader claim made by Kilcullen,
drawing a connection between roads and the power of a central state. Stated simply:
paved roads sap the power of a potential insurgency by allowing a government to project
its power out into more remote areas. As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler contend, remote
areas of terrain are most susceptible to an insurgency.110 Combined with low population
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density, the sheer distance of these areas from the center of state power makes them hard
to reach by government forces and therefore ideal for organizing a rebellion. Thus as
James Fearon and David Laitin conclude, “the most important determinants of the
prospects of an insurgency are most likely the police and military capabilities of the
government, and the reach of government institutions into rural areas.”111 By building
roads, and subsequently reducing the time needed to travel between two points, a central
government can more easily penetrate remote areas and quell resistance. States
throughout history have taken advantage of this fact to discipline terrain and expand their
authority, particularly the Roman Empire. According to Logan Thompson, the Roman
system of roads was developed because routes could not withstand the passage of large
quantities of troops, particularly during inclement weather. Unpaved roads disintegrated
into mud, seriously impeding the movement of troops, but by paving roads, armies could
progress up to twenty-five miles a day toward areas of unrest. Noting that knowledge of
this fact itself acted as a deterrent to the development of hostilities, Thompson concludes
that roads were the primary reason for the military effectiveness of the Roman Empire.112
Scholars investigating counterinsurgencies in the Philippines113, the Congo114, Malaya
and Burma115 have all attributed increased mobility and economic development to the
construction of infrastructure.
However, other civil war scholars contend that isolation acts as an inhibitor of
111
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insurgent violence. More recent work by scholars suggests that areas with higher
proportions of roads are more likely to face violent resistance. Halvard Buhaug and Jan
Ketil Rød tested underlying determinants behind civil wars in Africa and found that,
controlling for population, the density of roads is positively associated with the risk of
civil war — contradicting their initial hypothesis. Separatist conflicts, Buhaug concludes,
“occur in relatively more, not less developed regions.”116 Buhaug also concludes that
mountainous and forested landscape — areas that weaker national governments cannot
easily reach — also inhibits rebellion. In Afghanistan, locals have supported this strategy
of isolation in the mountainous northeast province in Nuristan, opposing the construction
of roads to keep foreigners out of the area.117
These conclusions also match additional studies on Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Somalia.
Clint Watts and Joe Felter suggest that one of the primary reasons the Al-Qaeda franchise
struggled to take root in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 was that the expected low
operational costs never materialized. Quoting from several uncovered letters between AlQaeda members, Watts demonstrates that Al-Qaeda leaders discovered that transportation
costs were “substantial and paralyzing for the Somali franchise.”118 Due in large part to
poor infrastructure, shipping and transportation costs consumed their resources. “The
very reasons that [Al-Qaeda] sought Somalia- an isolated safe haven for preparing and
conducting terrorist operations- also made it nearly impossible to sustain operations.”119
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In short, isolation and a lack of infrastructure can prevent a non-local insurgency from
taking root.

The Existing Evidence
Field researchers interpreting data from provincial reconstruction teams in eastern
Afghanistan support Kilcullen’s contention that roads reduce IED attacks and improve
security. Noting that skeptics have criticized the lack of rigorous assessment of PRT
projects, Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle preface their support for PRTs by
admitting, “There is no evidence that PRTs on their own have quelled violence.”120
However, after conducting research for two months in 2007 and two months in 2008
while working with four PRTs, Malkasian concludes that in at least three of the four
provinces studied — Khost, Kunar and Ghazni — road projects had a positive impact on
security. Of each PRTs spending among these three provinces, “30 to 60 percent went to
roads and bridges.”121 In Khost, roads received the largest portion of a $22 million
funding “blitz,” and within that province, Malkasian uses a Spearman’s Rank correlation
to conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between improvements in
safety in individual districts and the level of PRT spending. In Kunar, Malkasian takes
note of the drop in IED incidents along paved roads. IED incidents along the JalalalabadAsadabad highway fell as the road was paved, dropping “from a high of 17 in 2006 to 7
in 2007 following the road’s completion.”122 Like in Khost, Malkasian also explains that
the road projects improved governance by increasing local political participation in
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shuras. Malkasian argues that the same IED effect occurred along an additional PRTfunded road constructed in the Pech River Valley, dropping from a high of 21 in the first
6 months of 2006 (or 6 months before the start of the project) to 2 during the first 6
months of 2008 (around March 2008 when the project was completed).123 In Ghazni,
roads were paved in four of the five most dangerous districts. These five districts
received the highest concentration of PRT funding, and as in Khost, Malkasian concludes
that there is a statistically significant relationship between district security ratings and
PRT spending.124
However, these statistics supporting the claims made by road advocates have not
been rigorously analyzed. Malkasian concludes that PRTs “clearly…helped reduce
violence and governance…[T]he strategy of out posting and road building brought
security, revitalized local political institutions, and enabled the Afghan government to
deliver goods and services to the people for the first time.”125 However, Malkasian’s
analysis of individual roads in Kunar and Ghazni suffers from selection bias. To
determine the association between road construction and the quantity of IED attacks, a
study would need to contrast the quantity of attacks along paved roads against the
quantity attacks along unpaved roads over the same time span. Malkasian’s work does
not provide data for the latter, and without a comparable control group, his conclusions
cannot be generalized to the rest of Afghanistan. Malkasian also demonstrates a
statistically significant relationship between security ratings by district and PRT spending
in Khost and Ghazni provinces, but only notes that the correlation is supported by “weak

123

Malkasian and Meyerle, 18-19.
Malkasian and Meyerle, 23-24.
125
Malkasian and Meyerle, 21.
124

40
statistical evidence” — or correlation at the .05 level — in the endnotes. Because PRT
funding went to a variety of projects beyond roads, including the construction of schools,
dams and wells, the effect road construction itself cannot be isolated. Furthermore,
Malkasian also adds that the results for Kunar and Nuristan were not significant.126
Beyond Malkasian’s work, the influence of road projects on security has not been
comprehensively analyzed. US agencies have not conducted sound evaluations to
determine which projects have been most effective in achieving their goals, and in many
cases, US agencies are not reporting complete information on civilian road projects to
USAID.127 The few studies that have been conducted, such as the baseline studies for the
Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Heart roads, were completed after much of the work on
the project was done, skewing any data the evaluations might mind.128 Like Kilcullen’s
work, evidence supporting a connection between roads and improved security conditions
is largely anecdotal, while updates on road construction by USAID are incomplete and
are limited only to certain years.129
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IV. Roads: Weapon or Target?
The contradicting viewpoints among policymakers and theorists on the effect of
roads beg the question: do roads impact the frequency of IED attacks in Afghanistan, and
if so, is that impact positive or negative? The case studies examined in this thesis attempt
to shed some light on that question.

The Case Study
Two pairs of roads are examined in this case study: the Kabul-Gardez and
Gardez-Ghazni highways and the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road and Gereshk-Lashkar Gah
highways (see appendix, figures 9 and 10).
The decision to evaluate both pairs of highways was driven by several factors.
First, both paved highways were started and completed during the earliest portion of the
Afghan war logs between mid-2004 and late 2006. The Kabul-Gardez highway was
completed between July 2004 and September 2006,130 while the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road
highway completed between August 2005 and June 2006.131 The early completion dates
create an opportunity to evaluate the effects of the road projects both during construction
and three years after their completion. Given the low level of IED attacks in Afghanistan
in 2004, both roads also begin with roughly the same number of IED attacks per
kilometer. Second, both roads have comparable unpaved roads that can be used as a
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control. In the first case study, both roads begin at the same provincial capital — Gardez
— and lead to other provincial capitals, ensuring some level of comparability between the
two cases. The same applies for the second pair of roads, where both begin in the
provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and end along the ring road within Helmand province.
Third, the research proves that neither of the control roads was paved during the time
span of the war logs. The Gardez-Ghazni road opened for construction in September
2010, nearly a year after the final entry in the war logs.132 Similarly, coalition forces did
not start to pave the Gereshk-Lashkar Gah road, also known as “Route Trident,” until
mid-December 2009.133 The initial 7.6 kilometers of paved road were completed in
March 2010,134 and the extension, which will link up with existing roads to provide a
continuous road between Lashkar Gah and Garesk, began in July 2010.135

Data and Methodology
I use a subset of a new dataset of insurgent and coalition incidents across
Afghanistan for this case study, one assembled by the military and leaked by the website
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WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010.136 Known commonly in the media as the Afghan war logs,
the data contains tens of thousands of unique reports on the dates, geographic coordinates
and casualties of insurgent and coalition incidents from the start of 2004 to the end of
2009. The subset comes from the Guardian (UK), one of the three newspapers given
access to the documents prior to their release. The datajournalism project conducted by
investigative reporters at the Guardian includes only the 7,528 successful IED explosions
listed in the WikiLeaks documents. As Simon Rodgers, a news editor for the Guardian,
explains, the dataset “does not include person- or vehicle-borne suicide bombs… and
only include[s] IED explosions [and] IED ambushes - where an explosion is combined
with an ambush by insurgents.”137
The documents certainly do not represent a complete picture of the Afghan war,
but the documents are likely to correspond with other existing datasets in the case of
IEDs. Given limited information about the insurgency, no reporting mechanism can
account for all developments in Afghanistan in an entirely unbiased way. But as
O’Loughlin notes, media sources takes note of violent events when they occur, and as
such, other coders record and include these incidents in other datasets.138
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ArcGIS 9 was used to narrow down the IED incidents.139 Both datasets were
converted into shapefiles and compared to two shapefiles of the Afghan road network,
both of which were necessary to acquire the proper data for all four roads.140 The file
from the Geographic Information Support Team (GIST) included a key section of the
Gardez-Ghazni highway between Ghazni, Dowlat Khan and the Zurmat district in Paktia
province.141 The entire GIST road running from Gardez to Ghazni was also combined
with a section of road running from Gardez to the Zurmat district from the USDMA file.
The GIST file was also the only file that contained a road running through Gholam
Dastagir Kalay, a city between Gereshk and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province that only
Route Trident runs through. The remaining roads were taken from the USDMA shapefile.
A one-kilometer buffer was placed over all four roads (see appendix, figure 11), and
those IEDs falling within the boundaries were extracted from the dataset.
I define the treatment as the point at which the road project was completed, even
though portions of the road were constructed prior to its completion, because vehicles
cannot take full advantage of a paved road in the middle of its construction. Generally
portions of a road undergoing work are closed off to traffic, and it’s only once the project
is completed that the freshly paved road becomes available for public use.
139
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Thus, IED attacks that fell within the buffer were placed into two groups — those
that occurred prior to the completion of the road and those that occurred after.142 I then
calculated the average number of attacks in a year along all four roads for both pre- and
post-treatment. To control for the varying lengths of the roads, I divided the average
number of attacks in a year along all four roads by the respective length of each road (see
appendix, tables 4 and 6). The lengths of the four roads are listed below:
•

Kabul-Gardez (Treatment 1, T1) — 125 kilometers143

•

Gardez-Ghazni (Control 2, C1) — 92 kilometers144

•

Lashkar Gah-Ring Road (Treatment 2, T2) — 49 kilometers145

•

Gereskh-Lashkar Gah (Control 2, C2) — 37 kilometers146

Example: Kabul-Gardez Highway Post-Treatment, or T1B
59 IED attacks
3.33 years

=

17.7 attacks per year
125 km
=

17.7 attacks/year
0.1416 attacks per year
km

To find the difference in differences (DID) between both pairs of roads, the pretreatment numbers were subtracted from the post- treatment numbers, minus the
difference of the respective control road.
142

Grouping the data into two groups also helped to eliminate year-to-year variations in
IED attacks. IED incidents along the roads were initially grouped by year (see tables 1011, figures 4-5) and divided by total kilometers. Year-to-year variation complicated any
attempt to extract a correlation between paved roads and IED attacks.
143
USAID, “Road Update, Issue 65,” February 2007, 2.
144
Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program, USAID, “A Road Runs
Through It,” <https://www.irpaf.com/?pname=open&id=176&type=html&phpMyAdmin=3jLKUjxroDwu4VuxRBmi1
fE5PW4> (April 7, 2011).
145
USAID, “Road Update, Issue 65,” February 2007, 2.
146
This measurement is based on an estimation using ArcGIS.

46
DID1 = (T1B–T1A) – (C1B–C1A)
DID2 = (T2B–T2A) – (C2B–C2A)
Limitations
As with all observational case studies, the conclusions I can draw from this
research are limited and rely on a number of assumptions. I assume that the roads
examined in this study, both paved and unpaved, are representative of roads generally in
the southeast half of Afghanistan where IED attacks are most common. I examined two
sets of roads in different regions of the country in an attempt to address part of this issue,
but ultimately I cannot say with complete certainty that the roads examined accurately
reflect all other roads in the region. The study is designed to account for the varying
degrees in violence by province by studying roads branching out from a central location
to similarly important areas (provincial capitals) as well as the likelihood that larger roads
will suffer from a larger quantity of attacks. However, the case study design also cannot
rule out the possibility that an omitted third variable has skewed the results. Thus, given
the lack of total certainty that the relationship between paved roads and IED attacks is
entirely independent, any relationship found between the two variables should be viewed
with some degree of skepticism.
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Evaluating the Results

Figure 1. Case Study 1: Difference in attacks per kilometer before and after
treatment.
Table 4.
Case Study 1.
Treatment
(Kabul‐Gardez)
Control
(Gardez‐Ghazni)
Difference
Difference in Differences (DID1):

Post‐Treatment

Pre‐Treatment

Differences

0.1416

0.03

0.1116

0.136956522
0.004643478

0.028532609
0.001467391

0.108423913

0.003176087

Percent Change:

216.44%

As the graph demonstrates, the DID between the two roads is very small — just
over .003. While road paving accounts for a 216.44 percent increase in IED attacks per
year per kilometer when compared to the pre-treatment difference, the effect in terms of
IEDs per year is small. Presuming that longer roads are no more likely to be target of IED
attacks than shorter roads per kilometer, the road treatment increased IED attacks by .397
per year (see table 5).
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Table 5.
Case Study 1.
Treatment
(Kabul‐Gardez)
Untreated
(Kabul‐Gardez)
Control
(Gardez‐Ghazni)

Post‐Treatment

Pre‐Treatment

0.1416

Post‐T IEDs/year

0.03

0.1116

17.7

0.03

0.108423913

17.30298913

0.028532609

0.108423913

0.138423913
0.136956522

Differences

Effect:

0.397010875

Figure 2. Case Study 2: Difference in attacks per kilometer before and after
treatment
Table 6.
Case Study 2.
Treatment
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road)
Control
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah)
Difference
Difference in Differences (DID2):

Post‐Treatment

Pre‐Treatment

Differences

0.409302326

0.045977011

0.363325314

0.445003143
‐0.035700817

0.022367195
0.023609816

0.422635948

‐0.059310634

Percent Change:

‐251.21%

The DID is small in the second case study as well (-.059), although there is
greater variance in the pre- and post-treatment numbers. While the road paving accounts
for a 251.21 percent decrease in IEDs per year per kilometer when compared to the pre-
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treatment difference, the effect in terms of IEDs, given the same assumptions as the first
case study, is a decrease in IED attacks of 2.906 per year (see figure 3 and table 7).

Figure 3. A representation of the trajectory of the road if otherwise left
untreated.
Table 7.
Case Study 2.
Treatment
Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road)

Post‐Treatment

Pre‐Treatment

Differences

Post‐T IEDs/year

0.409302326

0.045977011

0.363325314

20.05581397

Untreated
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road)

0.468612959

0.045977011

0.422635948

22.96203499

Control
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah)

0.445003143

0.022367195

0.422635948
Effect

‐2.906221017
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V. Conclusion
Despite the number of arguments presented by policymakers, field researchers
and theorists about why paved roads should have an effect on IED attacks, either
positively or negatively, the results of the two case studies suggest that there is little to no
meaningful relationship between the two variables. Both DIDs were relatively small, and
when converted into IED attacks per year neither case demonstrated a change of more
than 3 IEDs per year. Presuming that the Department of Defense could find qualified
contractors capable of handling the same contract as K-9 Solutions Inc. signed with the
Marine Corps in 2010, the $49 million used to construct the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road
highway in the second case study could have paid for well over 600 additional trained
and certified bomb-sniffing dogs. As the most effective detection device currently
available, nearing an 80 percent success rate (compared to 50 percent among other
techniques), it is possible that hundreds of additional dogs could have met or surpassed
this difference. When measured by the frequency of incidents, roads do not appear to be
an effective tactic for addressing the problem of IEDs in Afghanistan.
This is not to suggest that there is no basis upon which to justify spending on road
construction. It is possible that IEDs improve trade within Afghanistan and subsequently
improve the economy, and testing alternative justifications for road construction is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, policymakers themselves have admitted that
roads have been primarily sold to members of Congress and the bureaucracy in terms of
security, not development.
Ultimately the results of this thesis suggest that the relationship between road
building and the frequency of IED attacks merits greater study. Given the vast sum of
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money spent combating IEDs — with hundreds of millions spent on road building and
billions spent on research and development — the United States government should
invest resources in more precisely and accurately measuring the effect of road building
on IED attacks. Learning whether roads are a cost effective method of combating IEDs
will help those in the policymaking world determine whether investments in road
construction are worth the cost or whether those resources are better spent on more
proven methods of IED detection and prevention.
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Appendix
Table 8.
Treatment
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road)

Pre‐Treatment
Post‐Treatment
Control
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah)

IED Attacks

IEDs per year/km

5
66

0.045977011
0.409302326

IED Attacks

IEDs per year/km

2
59

0.022367195
0.445003143

IED Attacks

IEDs per year/km

10
59

0.03
0.1416

IED Attacks

IEDs per year/km

7
42

0.028532609
0.136956522

Pre‐Treatment
Post‐Treatment

Table 9.
Treatment
(Kabul‐Gardez)

Pre‐Treatment
Post‐Treatment
Control
(Gardez‐Ghazni)

Pre‐Treatment
Post‐Treatment

Table 10.
Kabul‐Gardez
Year IED Attacks
2004
2
2005
5
2006
11
2007
17
2008
7
2009
27
Total
69

Length: 125 km
IED Attacks/Km
0.016
0.04
0.088
0.136
0.056
0.216

Gardez‐Ghazni
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

Length: 92 km
IED Attacks
3
1
4
17
11
13
49

IED Attacks/Km
0.032608696
0.010869565
0.043478261
0.184782609
0.119565217
0.141304348

Table 11.
Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total

IED Attacks
1
3
7
3
24
33
71

Length: 49 km
IED
Attacks/Km
0.020408163
0.06122449
0.142857143
0.06122449
0.489795918
0.673469388

Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah

Length: 37 km

Year

IED Attacks
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Total

1
1
2
4
54
49
61

IED
Attacks/Km
0.027027027
0.027027027
0.054054054
0.108108108
0.108108108
1.324324324
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Figure 4. Case Study 1: IED Incidents per year across both treatment and control
roads.

Figure 5. Case Study 2: IED incidents per year across both treatment and control
roads.
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Figure 6. A countrywide look at the location of IED in Afghanistan relative to
roads.
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Figure 7. Test Case 1: A visual representation of IED attacks from 2004-2009
along the treatment (Kabul-Gardez) highway in black and the control highway (GardezGhazni) in blue. The Kabul-Gardez road project was started in June 2004 and was
completed in September 2006.
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Figure 8. Test Case 2: A visual representation of IED attacks from 2004-2009
along the treatment (Lashkar Gah-Ring Road) highway in black and the control highway
(Gereshk-Lashkar Gah) in blue. The Laskhar Gah-Ring Road highway was started in
August 2005 and was completed in June 2006.
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Figure 9. A 1-kilometer buffer was placed over each of the four roads. IEDs
located within the buffer were included in the dataset.

58

Bibliography
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. Insurgent Abuses Against
Afghan Civilians. December 2008.
Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program. USAID. “A Road Runs
Through It,” https://www.irpaf.com/?pname=open&id=176&type=html&phpMyAdmin=3jLKUjxroDwu4Vux
RBmi1fE5PW4.
Associated Press. “Roadside Bombs Surge in Afghanistan.” Associated Press, June 4,
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31111482/ns/world_newssouth_and_central_asia (April 1, 2011).
Baker III, Fred W. “Clearing the Tangi: Task Force in Afghanistan Takes
Troubled Valley.” American Forces Press Service, http://www.army.mil/news/2009/03/10/17994-clearing-the-tangi-task-force-in-afghanistan-takestroubled-valley/.
Buhaug, Halvard and Jan Ketil Rød. “Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 19702001.” Political Geography 25, no 3 (March 2006).
Bergen, Peter. “The Taliban, Regrouped and Rearmed.” The Washington Post, September
10, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/08/AR2006090801614.html.
Bevan, James ed. “Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide.”
Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva: 2008.
Chivers, C.J. “Danger Rules Lawless Highway 1 in Afghanistan.” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/world/asia/03iht-afghan.1.8567407.html.

59
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars.” Oxford Economic
Papers 56 (2004).
U.S. Congress. U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Appropriations.
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs.
USAID Accomplishments in Afghanistan. 109th Cong., 1st sess., September 11,
2006, http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2006/ty060911.html.
Cordesman, Anthony H., Marissa Allison, and Jason Lemieux. IED Metrics of
Afghanistan, January 2004 – September 2010. Center for Strategic and
International Studies, November 11, 2010.
Corson-Knowles, David. “Highway Robbery: How Road Construction Expanded the
Burmese Military's Resource Access.” Journal of Politics and Society (2003).
Daily Times Pakistan. “Roads Key to Afghan Security.” Daily Times Pakistan, May 5,
2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\05\05\story_5-52008_pg7_50&utm_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wor
dtwit.
Danspeckgruber, Wolfgang and Robert P. Finn, ed. Building State and Security
in Afghanistan. Princeton: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2007.
Deady, Timothy K. “Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines,
1899-1902.” Parameters (Spring 2005).
U.S. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. November 8, 2010, (Joint Publication 1-02).
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. Annual Report FY 2007,

60
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/2007_JIEDDO%2520Annual%2520Rep
ort_(U).pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. Annual Report FY 2008,
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20090625_FULL_2008_Annual_Report
_Unclassified_v4.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. Annual Report FY 2009.
(Washington, DC: 2009).
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. JIEDDO Fact Sheet,
August 2010
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20100804_JIEDDO_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. “JIEDDO Fiscal Year 2011
Budget,” press release, February 5, 2010,
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/article.aspx?ID=854.
U.S. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General. Marine Corps
Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected Vehicles. December 8, 2008, Report No. D-2009-030.
http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/dod-ig-report-20081208c.pdf.
Erwin, Sandra. “Technology Falls Short in the War Against IEDs.” National Defense
Magazine, October 10, 2010,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=221.
Fearon, James and David Laitin. “Ethicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American
Political Science Review (August 2002): 14.
Flynn, Michael. “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions, and Objectives.”

61
(PowerPoint slides, December 22, 2009).
Foust, Joshua. “Thinking Critically About Road Construction.” Registran, May 6, 2008,
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2008/05/06/thinking-critically-about-roadconstruction/?utm_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=word
twit.
Gall, Carlotta. “Despite Years of U.S. Pressure, Taliban Fight on in Jagged Hills.” New
York Times, June 4, 2005,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E7D71438F937A35755C0
A9639C8B63.
Garamone, Jim. “Armored Humvees, Tactics Address IED Threats.” American
Forces Press Service, December 8, 2004,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24640.
Gauster, Markus. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.” George C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies Occasional Paper Series, no. 16
(January 2008).
Gjelten, Tom. “U.S. ‘Connects the Dots’ to Catch Roadside Bombers.” National
Public Radio, December 3, 2010, http://www.npr.org/2010/12/03/131755378/us-connects-the-dots-to-catch-roadside-bombers.
Goodson, Larry. “The Fragmentation of Culture in Afghanistan.” Alif: Journal of
Comparative Poetics, no. 18 (1998).
Grau, Lester W. and Mohammad Yahya Nawroz. “The Soviet War in
Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War?” Military Review,
(September/October 1995).

62
Gurr, Ted R. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
Hodge, Nathan. “Afghans Report More Roadside Bombs, Attacks on the Rise.” Wired,
April 9, 2010, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/afghans-report-moreroadside-bombs-attacks-still-on-the-rise/.
Ignatius, David. “Building Bridges in the Back of Beyond.” Washington Post, May 1,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/30/AR2008043003253.html?hpid=opinionsbox1&ut
m_source=wordtwit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=wordtwit.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in
Construction Roads, but Assessment for Determining Impact and a Sustainable
Maintenance Program Are Needed (2008), www.gao.gov/new.items/d08689.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight (2007),
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07801sp.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight (2007), 4, www.gao.gov/new.items/d09473sp.pdf.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve
Visibility and Coordination of DoD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Efforts (2010), www.gao.gov/new.items/d1095.pdf.
Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big
One. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Kopp, Carlo. “Technology of Improvised Explosive Devices.” Defence Today,
www.ausairpower.net/DT-IED-1007.pdf.

63
Lamothe, Dan. “Dogs Becoming Essential in Fight Against IEDs.” Marine Corps
Times, March 25, 2010,
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/marine_dogs_032510w/.
Laing, Aislinn and Ben Farmer. “Travelling by Road in Afghanistan is ‘now more
dangerous than under Taliban.’” Telegraph (UK), December 4, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/6718217/Travelling-by-roadin-Afghanistan-now-more-dangerous-than-under-Taliban.html.
Livingston, Ian S. et al. Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction &
Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan. Brookings Institution, February 28, 2011.
Malkasian, Carter and Gerald Meyerle. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do We
know They Work?” The Letort Papers (March 2009).
Military Training Technology. “Defeating the IED.” Military Training Technology,
February 2010, http://kmimediagroup.com/files/MT2%2015-1_JIEDDO.pdf.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Completion of the Kandahar-Heart
Highway.” Press release, July 7, 2009,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2009/7/1193560_1138.html.
Morrell Geoff. “DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell.” Press transcript, May
15, 2008, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4231.
Nasuti, Matthew. “The Ring Road: A Gift Afghanistan Cannot Afford.” Kabul
Press, September 29, 2009, http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article4093.
Northam, Jackie. “U.S. Troops Withdraw from Isolated Afghan Areas.” National Public
Radio, September 25, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113182575.

64
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Afghanistan: Post-War
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy by Kenneth Katzman (Washington, DC:
November 26, 2008).
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign
Assistance by Curt Tarnoff, (Washington DC: July 8, 2009).
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson
(Washington, DC: February 10, 2006).
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay
Wilson (Washington, DC: August 28, 2007).
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Mine-Resistant, AmbushProtected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew
Feickert, (Washington, DC: January 18, 2011).
Leithead, Alastair. “Taleban Rule the Road in Ghazni.” BBC News, August 6,
2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6933029.stm.
Lowe, Chris. “Afghan MRAP Wars: IEDs vs. Mobility.” May 24, 2010,
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/05/24/afghan-mrap-wars-ieds-vs-mobility/.
Lynch, Declan. “Royal Engineers in Afghanistan: Programmed for Peace.” New Civil
Engineer, September 16, 2010, <http://www.nce.co.uk/news/international/royalengineers-in-afghanistan-programmed-for-peace/8605910.article.
Neumann, Ronald E. The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan. Washington:
Potomac Books, 2009.

65
New Civil Engineer. “Road to Hearts and Minds.” New Civil Engineer, July 8, 2010,
http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/52419679/ROAD-TOHEARTS-amp-MINDS/fulltext.
O’Hara, Matthew. Detection of IED Emplacement in Urban Environments. Master’s
thesis (2008), Naval Postgraduate School.
O’Loughlin, John et al. “Peering Into the Fog of War: The Geography of the
WikiLeaks Afghanistan War Logs, 2004-2009,” Eurasian Geography and
Economics 51, no. 4 (2010).
Oates, Michael L. “US Government Efforts to Counter IEDs.” Foreign Press Center,
Washington, DC: December 3, 2010.
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20101206_FPC_LTG_Oates_on%2520_
EDs.pdf.
Omar, Mullah Mohammed. Afghanistan Islamic Emirate: Rules and Regulations for
Mujahidin (2009).
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf.
Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Central Asia, New York: Penguin Books, 2008.
Roberts, Bronwen. “Afghan Insecurity Putting Pressure on NGOs.” Agence FrancePresse, May 1, 2007, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/SODA72S55Z?OpenDocument&RSS20=02-P.
Rogers, Simon. “Wikileaks’ Afghanistan War Logs: How Our Datajournalism

66
Operation Worked.” Guardian (UK), July 27, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/jul/27/wikileaks-afghanistandata-datajournalism.
Rohde, David. “Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol of Failure.” New
York Times, September 5, 2008,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE5DD1631F936A3575AC0
A9609C8B63&pagewanted=print.
Salih, Muhammad Salih and Abubakar Siddique, “Death Stalks the Highway to Hell.”
Radio Free Europe, October 24, 2008,
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JJ24Df03.html.
Sanders, Ali. “U.S. Troops Experience Downturn in IED Violence.” JIEDDO
Public Affairs press release, February 3, 2011.
https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20110203_Downtrend_IED_story.pdf.
Scarborough, Rowan. “Hunter lauds tactic to snuff IEDs.” Washington Times, September
16, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/16/lawmaker-laudstactic-to-snuff-ieds-in-war-zones.
Sennott, Charles M. “Afghanistan: After 5 years, a forgotten war?” New York Times,
September 12, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/asia/12ihtafghan.2785628.html.
Shachtman, Noah. “Ratio-Friendly Jammers?” Wired, March 16, 2007
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/03/american_radiof/.
Taddeo, Valentina. “US Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan

67
Campaign.” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 29-31,
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/3/.
Thompson, Logan. “Roman Roads.” History Today 47, (February 1997).
Topping, Alexandra and Jo Adetunji. “Afghanistan War Logs: Wikileaks Founder
Rebuts White House Criticism.” The Guardian, July 26, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/war-logs-wikileaks-rebutscriticism.
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. “Engineers Complete Route Through Panther’s
Claw Territory.” Military Operations, March 19, 2010,
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/Engineers
CompleteSecureRouteThroughPanthersClawTerritory.htm.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan: Annual
Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009. Kabul: January 2010.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan Mid-Year
Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Kabul: August 2010.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Afghanistan
Rights Monitor Mid-Year Report, Civilian Casualties of Conflict January-June
2010. Kabul, Afghanistan. www.arm.org.af/file.php?id=2.
USAID. “Celebrating Road Construction in Ghazni.” Press release, September 30, 2010,
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/1372/Celebrating_Road_Construct
ion_in_Ghazni.
USAID. Performance Management Plan (PMP), Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods

68
Program Northern Region — Badakhshan and Takhar (ALP/N), No. 305-M-0005-00517-00, June 30, 2006, A7.
USAID, “Road Update, Issue 48.” August 7, 2005,
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/documents/countries/afghanistan/roadweekly
_082705.pdf.
USAID. “Road Update, Issue 65.” February 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2004/August/20040804163308ESnamfuaK0.1996533.html.
USAID. “Weekly Reports Archive.”
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia/countries/afghanistan/weeklyreports/.
Vanden Brook, Tom. “Armored trucks cut IED deaths among allied troops.” USA Today,
September 7, 2010.
Vanden Brook, Tom. “MRAPs can't stop newest weapon.” USA Today, May 31, 2007.
Walsh, Declan, Simon Rodgers and Paul Scruton. “WikiLeaks Afghanistan Files:
Every IED with Co-Ordinates,” July 26, 2010, http://image.guardian.co.uk/sysfiles/Guardian/documents/2010/07/28/ExplodedIED.xls
The White House. “The New Way Forward.” President Barack Obama, December 1,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidentsaddress.
The White House. “President Outlines War Effort.” President George W. Bush,
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/04/200204171.html.
Waterman, Shaun. “General: K-9 Teams Find IEDs Better than $10 Billion Tech Gear.”

69
Washington Times, October 20, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/general-k-9-teams-find-iedsbetter-10-billion-tech/.
Watts, Clint and Joe Felter. Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa. Harmony
Project: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (May 2007).
Williams, Brian Glyn. “Mullah Omar’s Missiles. A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in
Afghanistan.” Middle East Policy 15, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 31,
http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/publications.html.

